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11 Introduction
The standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching model of equilibrium
unemployment has been argued in many places to be inconsistent with key business cycle
facts. In particular, it cannot explain the high volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and
market tightness (Shimer, 2005), nor the persistence in the adjustment of these variables to
exogenous shocks (Fujita and Ramey, 2007). Subsequent research has focused on whether the
lack of internal propagation, both in terms of ampli￿cation and persistence, stems from the
structure of the model itself or whether it is a question of setting an appropriate calibration.
Firms in these models must expend resources to ￿ll job vacancies, a time-consuming
process in the presence of search frictions on labor markets. Under Nash bargaining as a
wage mechanism, wages absorb much of the change in the expected bene￿t to a new worker
induced by ￿uctuations in labor productivity. As a result, Shimer (2005) argues, the in-
centive to post vacancies changes little over the business cycle. Quite naturally, subsequent
research has focused on the dynamics of wages as a means of generating ampli￿cation of
exogenous innovations. Such studies have either altered the particulars of the wage deter-
mination mechanism (e.g. Shimer 2004), or as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), followed
an alternative calibration strategy that results in a rigid wage.1 In order to address the
second empirical shortcoming, the persistence in labor market adjustments to productivity
shocks, a second strand of research has focused on the structure of vacancy costs. Fujita
and Ramey (2007), for example, develop a story about sunk costs to vacancy creation such
that the strongest change in market tightness occurs several periods after the original shock.
1Examples of alternate wage determination include a demand-game auction (Hall, 2005) or staggered
wage contracting (Gertler and Trigari, 2009). In essence, the parametrization in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) of the value of non-market activities and the relative Nash bargaining weight ensures that the wage is
highly inelastic to its time varying components, i.e. labor productivity and the degree of market tightness.
2Their approach, however, does not generate any additional ampli￿cation.2
This paper extends the baseline search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment
by assuming that external ￿nance must be called upon to fund part of a ￿rm’s vacancy costs,
and that agency problems cause credit markets to be frictional. The thrust of this paper
is to show that evolving conditions on credit markets over the business cycle change the
opportunity cost of resources used by ￿rms to create new jobs in the face of small changes
in the expected bene￿t to a new worker, simultaneously addressing the lack of ampli￿cation
and persistence to productivity shocks outlined above.3 Acemoglu (2001) and Wasmer
and Weil (2004) have shown that credit market imperfections lead to higher equilibrium
unemployment by restricting ￿rm entry.4 This paper shows that such frictions matter for
the cyclical dynamics of the labor market. This paper also raises a broader case for the role
credit market imperfections in understanding aggregate dynamics operating through worker
as opposed to investment ￿ows, as has been the focus in models of ￿nancial intermediation
and agency costs such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Bernanke et al. (1999).
The model developed in this paper works as follows. Due to a problem of costly state
veri￿cation in lending relationships, ￿rms write standard debt contracts (Gale and Hellwig,
1985, Williamson, 1987) to fund vacancies over accumulated assets. The higher shadow
cost of external over internal funds increases the cost of vacancies, leading to a higher rate
of equilibrium unemployment. However, the degree of agency costs is alleviated during
economic upturns, lowering the shadow cost of resources allocated to job creation. This
2Fujita and Ramey (2007) argue that by combining their modeling of job vacancies with the calibration
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), their model can address both issues pertaining to the propagation of
productivity shocks. Alternate approaches to modeling vacancy costs include Yashiv (2006) and Rotemberg
(2006) in which the cost of vacancies is a declining function of the number of vacancies a ￿rm posts.
3This result is independent of whether external funding applies to recruiting costs alone or include the
wage bill. Section 3 develops and presents the results of a model in which both recruiting costs and the
wage bill require external funding. Linking current costs to ￿nancial markets is also a features of bank loan
models as in Christiano et al. (2005), or commercial debt models as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).
4Acemoglu (2001) provides evidence that credit constrained industries have lower employment shares and
Rendon (2001) ￿nds that labor demand is both restricted and more elastic at credit constrained ￿rms.
3opens two channels through which the elasticity of job vacancies to productivity is increased:
(i) a cost channel, driving a time-varying wedge in the job creation condition in which the
lowered opportunity cost of resources allocated to job creation during an upturn increases
the incentive to post vacancies; (ii) a wage channel - under Nash bargaining as a wage
mechanism, the lowered opportunity cost of vacancies limits part of the upward pressure
of market tightness on wages by improving the bargaining position of ￿rms. Note that
the source of wage rigidity is a consequence of frictional credit markets and not an inherent
feature of the wage rule or a particular calibration of the model. In addition, the opportunity
cost of resources used for recruiting is distinct from the ￿xed unit cost of a job vacancy and
the average cost of recruiting a worker, which is a function of the degree of congestion
on labor markets. Just as in the canonical model, this average cost, which appears in
the job creation condition, will be pro-cyclical. However, it will be more rigid due to the
presence of a counter-cyclical premium on external funds. Finally, the progressive easing
of ￿nancing constraints as ￿rms accumulate assets induces persistence in the adjustments
of labor market variables to productivity shocks. Whereas in standard search models of
equilibrium unemployment, or models with increased wage rigidity for that matter, the
largest response of market tightness is contemporaneous to the exogenous shock, the height
of the response in this setting is reached with a lag after the innovation. 5
Section 3 details the model’s quantitative results and sets them against a comparable
framework without credit frictions. This sections ￿nds the cost channel to be the most
important for the model’s ability to replicate the volatility relative to output and persistence
of labor market variables observed in the data. For example, the relative volatility of market
tightness reaches 12.45 (against 15.41 in the data) while only 3.76 in the standard model with
5The staggered nature of wage contracts in Gertler and Trigari (2009) is an exception in this literature
in that persistence to productivity shocks does arise.
4perfect credit markets, and the relative volatility of unemployment, which is 6.82 in the data,
rises to 3.26 in the presence of credit frictions compared to 0.82 in the standard model. 6 U.S.
quarterly data on market tightness display a high degree of persistence, measured as positive
auto-correlations in the growth rate of 0.67, 0.48 and 0.33 at the ￿rst, second and third lags
respectively. Allowing for frictional credit markets can generate auto-correlations of 0.62,
0.24 and 0.08 at the ￿rst, second and third lags, whereas a standard search model generates
virtually no auto-correlation. This criticism is akin to that of Real Business Cycles (RBC)
models advanced by Cogley and Nason (1995) in their inability to generated persistence in
the growth rate of output. In this last respect, the inclusion of credit frictions allows the
model to nearly perfectly match the persistence in the growth rate of output by inducing
large variations in employment over the business cycle. Section 3 also examines a series of
robustness issues. The results are very robust to an extension to externally funding part of
the wage bill over and above recruiting costs.
2 Model
The model is populated by two types of agents: ￿rms that produce using labor and house-
holds who decide on optimal consumption and purchases of risk free bonds. The allocation
of labor from households to ￿rms involves a costly and time-consuming matching process,
following the now common approach of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), adapted to a rep-
resentative household framework as in Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996). The additional
assumption is that ￿rms must seek external funds over accumulated assets in order to pay
for current vacancies, and that the lending relationship is subject to a credit market friction
6Second moments correspond to Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered data. Time series cover the period 1977:1 to
2005:4. The standard model refers to the Mortensen-Pissarides model in a discrete time setting, DSGE
framework, detailed in the appendix.
5of the costly state veri￿cation type. This incorporation of imperfect credit markets into a
DSGE framework builds on work by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) with the canonical real
business cycle model. The resulting debt contract is characterized by an optimal monitoring
threshold and vacancy postings. Although the assumption of a fraction of vacancy costs
needing external ￿nancing is su￿cient to generate the results in this paper, the model is
extended below to allow for the external funding of both recruiting costs and the wage bill,
with very little e￿ect on the results.
2.1 Labor markets and households
Firms post job vacancies Vt to attract unemployed workers Ut at a unit cost of , the
nature of which will be discussed in detail when calibrating the model. Jobs are ￿lled via
a constant returns to scale matching function taking vacancies and unemployed workers
M(Ut;Vt): De￿ne t = Vt
Ut
as labor market tightness from the point of view of the ￿rm,
or the v-u ratio. The matching probabilities are
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt = p(t) and
M(Ut;Vt)
Ut = f(t)
for ￿rms and workers respectively, with @p(t)=@t < 0 and @f(t)=@t > 0. Note that
f(t) = tp(t): Once matched, jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate  per period. Thus
employment Nt and unemployment Ut evolve according to
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + p(t)Vt (1)
Ut+1 = (1   f(t))Ut + Nt (2)
The representative household, given existing rates of employment and unemployment,
chooses optimal consumption and purchases of risk free bonds Bt, which pay a rate rt the




subject to the budget constraint WtNt +bUt +(1+rt 1)Bt 1 +t = Ct +Bt +Tt, and the
laws of motion for matched labor (1) and unemployment (2). The government raises Tt in
taxes to fund unemployment bene￿ts Utb, while employed workers earn the wage Wt. t
are ￿rm dividends rebated lump sum at the end of the period. Denoting the multiplier on
the budget constraint by ; the ￿rst order conditions are
(Ct) : UC(Ct) = t (3)
(Bt) : t = Ett+1(1 + rt) (4)
2.2 Financial contract and vacancy decisions
The informational assumptions are chosen to generate standard debt contracts, in the tradi-
tion of Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1987), set in a quantitative macroeconomic
framework as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The contracts are written on a competitive
capital market (in the sense that there is a large number of insigni￿cant lenders and ￿rms)
and lenders are assumed to hold su￿ciently large and diversi￿ed portfolios to ensure perfect
risk pooling, with the result that investors behave as if they were risk neutral. Repayment of
the debt is assumed to occur within the period: the contract is negotiated at the beginning
of the time period and resolved by the end of the same period.8 The competitive pressure
7As in Andolfatto (1996), each worker is a member of a household that o￿ers perfect insurance against
labor market outcomes and is involved in a passive search process. Labor force participation choices are
not considered here, individuals are either employed or unemployed. See Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) or
Haefke and Reiter (2006) for models of labor market participation.
8The present contract is written for intra-period loans while Bernanke et al (1999) consider inter-period
contracts which take into account aggregate uncertainty.
7ensures that each lender-￿rm pair will write a contract which maximizes the expected value
of the ￿rm subject to the constraint that the expected return to the lender cover the amount
borrowed.
De￿ne ￿rm period net revenues as x(Xt   Wt)Nt, where Xt is the aggregate level of
technology, Wt is the wage rate. x is a random variable, i.i.d. across ￿rms and time, drawn
from a positive support with E(x) = 1, density h(x) and distribution H(x).9 The crucial
assumption for the contractual problem is that agents have asymmetric information over
the realization of the random variable x: This state can only be observed by lenders at
some cost proportional to realized net revenues, 0 < t < 1. Levine et al (2004), using
￿rm level data over the period 1997Q2 to 2003Q3, estimate the resource cost of monitoring
consistent with the spread on corporate bonds and the expected risk of default reached a
low of  = 0:07 during the late 1990s expansion, and a high of  = 0:46 during the 2001
recession. This variation may capture the fact that the value of liquidated assets following
bankruptcy is subject to strong illiquidity e￿ects that are highly cyclical, implying a much
greater cost of default to the lender during an economic downturn (Ramey and Shapiro,
2001, Pulvino, 1998).10 Consequently, and contrary to previous applications of costly state
veri￿cation problems, it is assumed here that monitoring costs increase during a downturn
according to the relationship t = g(Xt), with g0(Xt) < 0 and g00(Xt) < 0. The e￿ect of the
proposed modi￿cation are circumscribed to the dynamics of the external ￿nance premium, in
a manner detailed below, as opposed to an alternative approach taken by Faia and Monacelli
9Alternatively, the ￿rm’s period net revenue could be expressed as (xX   W)N with x drawn from a
positive support with lower bound W. Either formulation guarantees a positive payo￿ function over the
support of the idiosyncratic productivity, ensuring that the problem is well de￿ned. This is similar to the
approach in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) which consists of assuming that ￿rms sell their product at a time
varying mark-up over costs.
10Pulvino (1998), for example, ￿nds that ￿nancially constrained airlines sell air crafts at a 14% discount to
the average market price, but that these discounts exist only in times when the airline industry is depressed
and not when it is booming.
8(2007) .11
The timing of events in each period is as follows. Assume that vacancy costs Vt must be
paid before production occurs. All agents observe the aggregate state Xt and, given initial
assets At, ￿rms borrow (Vt   At) from ￿nancial markets to pay for period vacancy postings.
Lenders and borrowers agree on a contract that speci￿es a cuto￿ productivity xt such that
if x > xt, the borrower pays xt (Xt   Wt)Nt and keeps the equity (xt  x)(Xt   Wt)Nt. If
x < xt, the borrower receives nothing and the lender claims the residual net of monitoring
costs.














with G0(xt) = xth(xt): It is easy to see that the expected gross share to the lender will
always be positive.12 Given this set of de￿nitions we can conveniently express the lender’s
participation constraint as [ (xt)   tG(xt)](Xt   Wt)Nt = (Vt   At), which states that
the return net of monitoring costs must equal the value of the loan.
Given the assumptions on the functional forms, notably constant returns to scale in
11The latter assume that the mean of the random variable x is increasing in aggregate productivity:
E(xjXt) = X

t , where  > 1. While an e￿ective strategy to generate a counter-cyclical external ￿nance
premium, this approach bears the unappealing e￿ect of increasing the elasticity of e￿ective TFP, now X
1+,
to exogenous productivity shocks. Thus any ampli￿cation in their model is a conjunction of the increased
variance of e￿ective TFP and counter-cyclical external ￿nancing constraints. For a detailed analysis of the
conditions under which credit market frictions create a ￿nancial accelerator which destabilizes the economy,
see House (2006).
12To do so, take the limits limx!0  (x) =
R 1
0 xdH(x) = 0; limx!1  (x) =
R 1
0 xdH(x) = 1 > 0 and
recall that  (x) is strictly increasing and concave in x. Note that the expected share of returns going to the
borrower under the contract is (xt) =
R 1
xt (x   xt)dH(x). Note that  (xt) + (xt) = 1:
9production and a linear monitoring technology, only the evolution of aggregate assets is
needed to know the cost faced by ￿rms on credit markets. As such, all ￿rms will choose
the same ratio of vacancies to assets allowing the model to remain in representative ￿rm
setting (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). The evolution of aggregate assets is given by
At+1 = & [1    (xt)](Xt   Wt)Nt, where the parameter 0 < & < 1 ensures that self-￿nancing













focuses on the premium associated with external funds, t 
tG(xt)(Xt Wt)Nt
Vt At , which for any
 > 0 is strictly positive.
We can now write the optimal incentive compatible contracting problem with non-
stochastic monitoring and repayment within the period. Vacancy postings Vt and the thresh-
old xt are chosen to maximize the expected value of the ￿rm, given aggregate states Xt,








subject to [ (xt)   tG(xt)](Xt   Wt)Nt = (Vt   At)
and Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + Vtp(t)
13The assumption of some depletion in the stock of assets is needed to rule out eventual self-￿nancing.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) assume that consumers and entrepreneurs have di￿erent time discount factors,
while Bernanke et al. (1999) assume that a fraction of the entrepreneurial population exits every period
consuming their assets on the way out. This paper assumes that ￿rms retain a fraction of their earnings
toward next period’s assets while rebating the remaining to households as dividends.
10where ￿rms use the stochastic discount factor 
t+1
t .
2.3 Job creation under credit constraints
Denote the multiplier on the lender’s participation constraint by . The optimality condition







equating the average economic cost of a vacancy,
t
p(t), to the discounted expected marginal
value of an additional employed worker Et
t+1
t JN;t+1. Note that the average cost of re-
cruiting a worker is in fact
(1+t)
p(t) .
In order to derive the marginal value of a worker to the ￿rm, JN;t, di￿erentiate the ￿rm’s
value function with respect to N,




The ￿rst term corresponds to the net return on an employee accruing to the ￿rm under the
debt contract. The second term captures the value an additional worker brings to the ￿rm
by relaxing the ￿nancing constraint in terms of an increased ability to reimburse the loan.
The ￿nal term captures the value of the continued relationship. For the sake of simplifying
the notation, call 
(xt)  1    (xt) + t [ (xt)   tG(xt)]. Combining the marginal value
of a worker with the optimality condition for vacancies, and making use of the household














11At this stage it is useful to show how this setting with credit frictions compares to a
standard search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment. 14 Consider ￿rst the
credit constraint multiplier t on the cost side of the job creation condition, which is the
shadow cost of external over internal funds. This measure indicates how binding are credit
constraints and, consequently, the term
t
p(t) should be interpreted as the opportunity cost
to the ￿rm of resources allocated to recruiting workers. From the ￿rst order condition for





In the absence of monitoring costs the threshold x tends to the lower bound of its support.
It is straightforward to show that @t=@xt > 0; and that in the limit limxt!0 t = 1. As a
result, for any positive monitoring cost the presence of credit frictions drives up the average
economic cost of vacancy postings to
t
p(t), as opposed to

p(t). Signi￿cantly, for the purpose
of this paper, an improvement in the state of credit markets, measured as a decrease in ,
is a decrease in the opportunity cost of resources allocated to job creation, but not in the
average cost of recruiting a worker
(1+t)
p(t) which, as we will see, will remain pro-cyclical.
Second, one can show that limxt!0 
(xt) = 1, such that in the absence of monitoring
costs the ￿rst order condition (6) collapses to the standard job creation condition in a













The received argument for the lack of ampli￿cation of productivity shocks is easily under-
14The appendix develops the model referred to as the standard search and matching model of equilibrium
unemployment model in discrete time.
12stood by this job creation condition equating the average cost of a vacancy to the expected
bene￿t of a new job (see Shimer, 2005, Hall, 2005). A sudden rise in productivity, increas-
ing the revenues generated by a job, increases the incentive to post vacancies. The same
rise in productivity, however, leads to a rise in the wage which reduces the pro￿ts accru-
ing to the ￿rm. For most applications of the Nash bargaining solution, the wage is highly
elastic to productivity such that the pro￿ts from a job for the ￿rm are relatively inelastic
to productivity shocks and, as a consequence, so are vacancy postings. Quite naturally, a
￿rst response to this issue has been to induce greater wage rigidity by either changing the
structure of the model, i.e. settling on di￿erent wage determination mechanisms (Hall, 2005,
Gertler and Trigari, 2009), or following a calibration strategy resulting in a wage less elastic
to productivity (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008).
There is, however, a second, overlooked, dampening mechanism built into the job creation
condition. The same event leading to a rise in the job ￿nding hazard for workers, and their
ability to negotiate higher wages, also corresponds to an increase in the congestion facing
￿rms on the labor market. In other words, each job vacancy faces a decreasing probability
p(t) of being ￿lled in a given unit of time. This increase in the average cost of hiring a
worker further restricts ￿rm entry, limiting the propagation of productivity shocks. Here,
credit market imperfections have the potential to amplify productivity shocks in a manner
that is fundamentally di￿erent, operating through the cost side of the job creation condition.
Recall that in the presence of credit frictions the average economic cost to ￿lling a vacancy is
t
p(t), whereas in the standard model it is

p(t). The multiplier on the lender’s participation
constraint, t, in e￿ect drives a time varying wedge on the cost side relative to the frictionless
model. If these constraints are counter-cyclical, or t decreases during an economic upturn,
there is a downward push on the opportunity cost of recruiting workers that increases the
13incentive for ￿rms to post job vacancies independently of changes in the expected bene￿t
of a new worker. The strong congestion e￿ects on labor markets imply, however, that the
average cost
(1+t)
p(t) remains pro-cyclical, yet more rigid over the business cycle.
2.4 Workers and wages
The model is fully described once the rule for wages is determined. In order to de￿ne the
values of a job (HN) and unemployment (HU) to a worker, di￿erentiate the household’s
value function with respect to N and U:
HN;t = tWt + Et [(1   )HN;t+1 + HU;t+1]
HU;t = tb + Et [(1   f(t))HU;t+1 + f(t)HN;t+1]
The current value of a job corresponds to the wage measured in utils and the discounted
expected values of next period’s state, which with probability (1   ) remains employment.
The value of unemployment is derived from the value of non-market activities, tb, and the
discounted expected value of next period’s state, which with probability f(t) is employment.
The surplus of a worker-￿rm match, de￿ned as St = JN;t+
HN;t HU;t
t ; is split under a gen-







where  is the worker’s bargaining weight. Wages are negotiated at the beginning of the
period once the aggregate state is observed but before the ￿rm draws an idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. The wage is not a function of the idiosyncratic productivity, lest it reveal the
￿rm’s productivity draw to creditors, but will re￿ect the terms faced by the ￿rm on credit
14markets.15 The ￿rst order condition to this problem,








(xt), describes a rule for sharing the joint surplus of the relationship
that di￿ers from the usual application of Nash bargaining to wage determination in that the
sharing weight t depends on the state of credit markets, and can di￿er from the constant
bargaining weight . An increase in the term 
(xt), which re￿ects a greater degree of credit
market imperfection, improves the ￿rm’s e￿ective bargaining power as the ￿rm’s surplus










+ (1   )b (9)
As with the job creation condition, when monitoring costs tend to 0 the wage rule (9)
collapses to
Wt =  [Xt + t] + (1   )b (10)
This is simply the wage rule in a search model of equilibrium unemployment without credit
frictions, leading to the following proposition
Proposition 1 - The canonical Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model of equi-
librium unemployment is a special case of the present model with frictional credit markets
when the cost of monitoring tends to zero .
The steady state and quantitative implications for the dynamics labor markets are dis-
15The study of possible separating equilibria on credit markets due to heterogeneous wages is beyond the
scope of this paper. It is also assumed that wages cannot be renegotiated ex-post. Details on the derivation
of the wage are presented in the appendix.
15cussed in the next section. However, one important aspect of the modi￿ed wage rule is




(xt)t which, along with the value of non-market activities, captures the relative
bargaining positions of workers and ￿rms. During an upturn, market tightness rises making
it more costly for ￿rms to pull out of wage negotiations to search for another worker (recall
that a rise in  implies a drop in the probability of meeting a worker p()). In the pres-








(x) > 1 and


(x) tends to 1 as x tends to zero. The strengthened bargaining position
of ￿rms somewhat limits the upward pressure on wages stemming from the rise in market
tightness. The end result is to induce some degree of wage rigidity which will contribute to
amplifying productivity shocks in the manner outlined above.
2.5 Closing the model
From the household’s budget constraint, it is straightforward to derive an aggregate resource
constraint
Yt [1   tG(xt)] = Ct + Vt
where Yt = XtNt, tG(xt) are resources consumed in monitoring and Vt are vacancy costs.
The equilibrium of the model is then de￿ned by equations (3) and (4) from household
optimization, a job creation condition (6), optimality condition for the threshold xt in (7),
the de￿nition of market tightness, the lender’s participation constraint, a wage rule (12),
the aggregate resource constraint and laws of motion for asset accumulation, aggregate
employment and unemployment.
163 Propagation properties of ￿nancial and labor market fric-
tions
Before discussing some of the steady state labor market implications of credit market frictions
in this setting, the assumptions on functional forms and calibration are presented in detail.
The model is then solved by computing the unique rational expectations solution for a log-
linearization around the deterministic steady state, and the dynamics are evaluated with a
series of unconditional second moments and impulse response functions. The performance
of the model is assessed by presenting results for a standard labor search model as a basis
for comparison and performing a series a sensitivity analysis to key parameters and aspects
of the model, including an extension to external ￿nancing of the wage bill.
3.1 Functional forms and calibration
Following much of the real business cycle literature, aggregate technology is assumed sta-
tionary and to evolve according to




X) and 0 < X < 1. Staying within this literature, the relevant parameters
are chosen as X = 0:975 and X = 0:0072 (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999).
For household preferences, period utility is de￿ned as U(C) = logC. The idiosyncratic





log(x)). Finally, following much of the labor search literature, the matching
technology is a Cobb-Douglas M(U;V ) = UV 1 , with 0 <  < 1 and  > 0.
The model is calibrated to quarterly data. The discount factor  = 0:992 is set so as
17to match an average annual real yield on a risk-free 3-month treasury bill of 3.3%. For pa-
rameters pertaining to ￿nancial factors, the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks and the parameter & in the asset accumulation equation are set jointly to match two
observations: i) a steady state quarterly default rate H( x) of 1%, corresponding to the val-
ues reported in both Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999); ii) a steady
state proportion of vacancy costs funded externally of two thirds. This is consistent with
evidence in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989) and Buera and Shin (2008) on the proportion
of ￿rm current expenditure ￿nanced externally. This calibration, which results in values of
x = 0:23 and & = 0:66, also implies a steady state leverage ratio
V  A
A of 2, the target
employed in Bernanke et al. (1999). Other investigations, such as Christiano et al. (2005),
have assumed that all current costs, in their case the entire wage bill, must be ￿nanced
through bank loans. It is important to note here that model is extended below to funding
a fraction of both the wage bill and current vacancy costs to assess the importance of this
assumption for the main results.
There is no direct measure of the model’s external ￿nance premium in the data, but
several proxies are regarded as good indicators (see Gomes, Yaron and Zhang, 2003, Levin
et al., 2004). One such indicator, the corporate bond spread, averaged 108 basis point over
the period 1971Q1 to 2007Q4. Consequently, the steady state resource cost of monitoring is
set to  = 0:25, targeting this premium of external over internal funds. This also corresponds
to the resource cost of monitoring in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Next, the elasticity of
resource cost of monitoring to changes in aggregate productivity is calibrated such that the
cost of monitoring doubles during a recession due to high degrees of illiquidity in the assets
used as collateral.16 The sensitivity of the model results to the calibration of the credit
16An alternative strategy would have been to calibrate this elasticity to match the volatility relative to
output of the chosen indicator of the external ￿nance premium. However, as has been the challenge in the
18market will examined in detail.
Several authors have argued that the targeted steady state rate of unemployment should
include more than the rate of workers counted as unemployed as the model does not account
for non-participation. Krause and Lubik (2007), for example, choose an unemployment rate
of 12%, above the average rate observed for the United States. The benchmark calibration,
however, will target a 10% unemployment rate, a mid point between the later authors and
the value of 7% in Gertler and Trigari (2009). This is achieved by adjusting the level
parameter  in the matching function. According to the study by Baron et al. (1997), the
average cost of time spent hiring one worker is approximately 3% of quarterly hours, and
up to 4.5% if it is assumed that hiring is done by supervisors with higher wages (Silva and




The elasticity of the labor matching function, , is set to 0:72, corresponding to the
estimated elasticity in Shimer (2005). In the baseline parametrization, the household’s
bargaining weight in wage negotiations, , is set to 0:5, a mid-point chosen to strike a
balance between the extremes advocated in the literature. However, this parameter will be
the focus of a detailed sensitivity analysis. Note the the e￿ective share, , is 0.495 under this
calibration. Finally, the quarterly rate of job separation is set to 6%, corresponding to the
evidence presented in Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006), and the value of non-market
activities b = 0:75. This baseline calibration results in a replacement rate b=W of 0.77. It is
well known that the properties of labor search models change dramatically as this ratio tends
to unity, and setting a high value as advocated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) has the
unappealing implication that workers gain little utility from accepting a job (see Mortensen
asset pricing literature, the volatility is more than an order of magnitude above that of aggregate output
and, with log-preferences, it would not be possible to match this target. See Jermann (1998).
19and Nagypal, 2007). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) reconcile the standard search model
with key labor market statistics by employing an elevated value of the replacement rate of
0.96. Rotemberg (2006) chooses a value of 0.9, while Elsby and Michaels (2008) set the
rate at a lower 0.86. In addition, the former adopt an extremely low value of the bargaining
parameter in order to generate a wage with a low elasticity to productivity. Shimer (2005)
sets the bargaining weight equal to the weight on unemployment in the matching function
as under the ’Hosios rule’ (Hosios, 1990) in order to ensure constrained e￿ciency of the
decentralized solution. While there is no de￿nitive value for the replacement rate, it is
shown below that the result are robust to much lower values .
3.2 Steady state implications
Proposition 2 - There exists a unique steady state equilibrium in which the rate of unemploy-
ment is strictly increasing in the resource cost of monitoring, .
Proof. The job creation condition in the presence of credit constraints can express the
wage as a decreasing function of market tightness









where aggregate productivity has been normalized to 1. Relative to the case with perfect
credit markets, the additional cost induced by the necessity of external funds implies a
steeper curve by the factor


(x) > 1, with






Figure 1 plots in (;W) space the job creation curve for the model with (solid line) and
without (dashed line) credit frictions. The wage rule in the presence of credit frictions,
W = (1 + 


(x)) + (1   )b, has a slope greater than in the absence of credit market
20friction by the same factor


(x) > 1. This captures the greater opportunity cost of a match
to the ￿rm that workers can exploit and, conditional on ( + (1   )b) < 1, the intersection
of the wage rule and job creation condition is unique.



















Figure 1: Steady state labor market equilibrium
Combined, the two labor market equilibrium conditions, job creation and the wage rule,
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= (1   )[1   b]
where  denotes equilibrium market tightness in the frictionless case. ~  <  follows
from the fact that (x) > 1 for any strictly positive value of the monitoring cost . To
see the e￿ect of an increase in  on market tightness, note that
@(x)
@ > 0. As a result,
an increase in monitoring costs leads to a decrease in equilibrium labor market tightness
which, through the Beveridge relationship U = 
+f(), implies a greater steady state rate of
21Table 1: Credit frictions and steady state unemployment rates
Monitoring cost  0 0.25 0.5
Premium 0% 0.93% 19%
Unemployment rate 9.93% 10% 10.76%
unemployment.17 This insight is similar to that in Acemoglu (2001) and Wasmer and Weil
(2004) in that credit friction restricts ￿rm entry on labor markets. Table 1 explores the
steady state implications quantitatively and ￿nds that reasonable degrees of credit market
imperfections have a negligible impact on the rate of unemployment. Removing all frictions
reduces the steady state rate of unemployment from 10% to 9.93%. Moreover, increasing the
resource cost of monitoring and steady state default rate such that the premium reaches 19%
only increase the unemployment rate to 10.76%. Therefore the impact of ￿nancial frictions
in the long run in this set-up are modest. As the next sections will show this need not be
the case in the short run.
3.3 Intuition for propagation on the labor market
Looking at the impact of a permanent change in aggregate productivity on equilibrium
market tightness yields some intuition into the sources of propagation induced by imperfect
credit markets. But ￿rst, consider the elasticity of market tightness to productivity in the




17The e￿ect on the equilibrium wage is ambiguous as higher recruiting costs both lowers job o￿ers and
a￿ects the threat point in wage bargaining to the advantage of workers.
22where () =  [ + (r + )=p()] and households have been assumed to be risk neutral.
The numerator captures the share of the change in labor productivity retained by the ￿rm
after paying the wage. The ￿rst term within the brackets in the denominator corresponds
to the share of the change in productivity going to the worker. One clearly sees through this
expression how a lower bargaining weight  creates a stronger elasticity of the incentive to
post job vacancies to changes in productivity. Finally, the term (r + )=p() corresponds
to the increase in the cost of recruiting a worker net of the discounted future value of that
worker to the ￿rm as the outcome of a rise in productivity is an increase congestion facing
open job vacancies on labor markets.









(x)  0, recalling that (x) 


(x)  1 and that this ratio tends to 1
as conditions on credit markets improve. The ￿rst block is similar to the elasticity in the
absence of credit market frictions and, given the baseline parametrization, (~ )(x)  ().
The di￿erence therefore lies in the bracketed term [1   (1   b);X] and in particular, the
magnitude of ampli￿cation will depend heavily on the elasticity ;X, which re￿ects the
change in the opportunity cost of resources allocated to recruiting to changes in productivity.
This will be discussed, along with the quantitative results, in the following subsection.
3.4 Dynamic results
Several authors, as mentioned earlier, have noted the failure of the Mortensen-Pissarides
framework to generate su￿cient internal propagation of exogenous shocks to match key
labor market statistics. Table 2 reports the Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered standard deviation
23relative to aggregate output of variables central to the labor market, along with their contem-
poraneous correlation with the cyclical component of aggregate output. The ￿rst columns
set the performance of the standard labor search model against moments from U.S. data
and highlight its shortcomings in terms of ampli￿cation. The relative volatility of market
tightness generated by the standard model is only 24% of that in the data. The dismal
performance of the model extends to job vacancies which have a relative volatility of 8.83
in the data and 3.27 in the standard model. The performance in terms of unemployment
or employment is hardly any better: the model generates a relative standard deviation for
unemployment of 0.82 against a relative standard deviation of 6.83 in the data, or just 12%
of the relative volatility observed in the data.
The second signi￿cant shortcoming concerns the persistence in the adjustment to exoge-
nous shocks. Evidence uncovered from reduced form VARs show that market tightness (and
vacancies) have a sluggish response to productivity shocks, peaking several quarters after
the innovation (see Fujita and Ramey, 2007). The last three rows of Table 2 report another
measure of this persistence, the auto-correlation in the growth rate of market tightness.
The data is characterized by a high degree of positive auto-correlation at the ￿rst three lags
while the standard search model generates virtually no persistence. With regards to output
growth, the standard search model does generate some persistence essentially due to the
predetermined nature of employment. However, ￿uctuations in the later are too weak for
the model to be consistent with the data.
3.4.1 Ampli￿cation and persistence under imperfect credit markets
We begin by examining, in Figure 2, the responses of vacancies and market tightness to a
positive productivity shock in the standard (dashed line) and proposed (solid line) models.
24Table 2: Unconditional 2nd moments
1977:1-2005:4 U.S. data Labor search Labor search with
credit friction
Variable: a b a b a b
U 6:83 -0.88 0.82 -0.70 2.37 -0.75
V 8:83 0.89 3.27 0.97 8.95 0.97
 15:41 0.90 3.76 0.99 10.58 0.99
N 0:48 0.82 0.09 0.70 0.27 0.74
(Y ) 1.40 1 1.15
:  Y  Y  Y
corr(; 1) 0.67 0.26 001 0.05 0.48 0.15
corr(; 2) 0.48 0.23 0 0.02 0.03 0.13
corr(; 3) 0.33 0.08 0 0 0 0.05
a: Standard deviation relative to output; b: contemporaneous correlation with
output. All moments, but growth rate, are Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered;
Data sources: BLS, BEA.
The introduction of credit frictions yields two improvements: ￿rst, the responses are largely
ampli￿ed; second, the responses are persistent, or the adjustment to the exogenous innova-
tion is "sluggish." The unconditional second moments for the proposed model, presented in
the last columns of Table 2, show a relative volatility of job vacancies remarkably close to
its empirical counterpart at 8.95, compared to 8.83 in the data. The increase in the relative
volatility of market tightness is equally large, rising to 10.58 compared to 15.41 in the data.
In terms of persistence, deviations in market tightness peak several quarters after the shock.
More precisely, the model generates elevated positive auto-correlations in the growth rate
of market tightness, close to the data at the ￿rst lag but decaying too rapidly at the second
and third (see the last three rows of Table 2).
Understanding the present results lies in the dynamics of the cost and wage channels
of propagation outlined earlier. As the previous section discussed the extent to which both
depend on the evolution of the measure of credit market imperfection (x), the ￿rst panel
of Figure 3 plots its response following the same expansionary shock to productivity. While

















































































Search with credit friction
Standard labor search
Figure 2: IRF to a positive productivity shock, job vacancies and labor market tightness
the constraint is relaxed on impact, the accumulation of assets pushes the constraint to its
lowest level with a lag. The e￿ect on the job creation condition is not strongest, therefore,
contemporaneously to the productivity shock, as is in the case in the standard model and
illustrated in Figure 2. Over the business cycle, ( x) has a volatility relative to output of 8
and a contemporaneous correlation of -0.97.
Recall that the average cost of recruiting in the canonical model,

p(t), is highly pro-
cyclical: its contemporaneous correlation with output is 0.99 and its standard deviation
relative to output is 2.7. While the shadow cost of external resources  and the premium
on external funds  are counter-cyclical, the average cost of recruiting
(1+t)
p(t) remains pro-
cyclical, with corresponding moments of 0.97 and 6.17, respectively.





















































































Search with credit friction
Standard labor search
Figure 3: IRFs to a positive productivity shock, credit market constraints and wage
The wage channel is illustrated in the second panel of Figure 3. Following an innovation
26to productivity, wages do not initially respond as strongly as in the standard model, increas-
ing progressively for several quarters. This rigidity contributes to the elasticity of the initial
response of market tightness and vacancies to a productivity shock, which is greater in the
model with credit frictions (again, see Figure 2). As market tightness continues to rise more
that the reduction in (x), the wage peaks after a few quarters such that the wage e￿ect
is operative only contemporaneously to the productivity shock. Moreover, the continued
rise in market tightness, even as the wage is increasing, leads to the conclusion that the
cost channel is largely dominant in generating the propagation of productivity shocks. This
reinforces the main argument that endogenously evolving conditions on credit markets con-
tribute to ￿uctuations on labor markets through the change in the opportunity of resources
used by ￿rms to create jobs.






















































































Search with credit friction
Standard labor search
Figure 4: IRFs to a positive productivity shock, unemployment and output
The large propagation potential of ￿nancial frictions in this setting results in a standard
deviation of aggregate unemployment of 2.37, and standard deviation of aggregate output of
1.15, up from 1 for the model with perfect credit markets. Although a signi￿cant improve-
ment upon the standard model, this still falls short of the data. Figure 4, which plots the
responses of unemployment and output to a positive productivity shock, illustrates the full
impact of this ￿nancial accelerator on aggregate activity. The strong rise in hirings leads to
a deep and prolonged drop in the unemployment rate. It immediately follows that output
27continues to expand several quarters after the innovation, a pattern not present in the stan-
dard model. As a result, the model with credit frictions generates positive auto-correlations
in the growth rate of output at the ￿rst three lags of 0.15, 0.13 and 0.05, compared to 0.26,
0.23, 0.08 in the data, going a long way in addressing the lack of endogenous persistence in
real business cycle models raised by Cogley and Nason (1995). 18
3.4.2 Robustness to the calibration of the credit market
This section examines the behavior of the model along the dimension of the calibration of the
credit market. The ￿rst columns of Table 3 present the e￿ects of calibrating to either 55 or
135 point premia by changing the steady state value of the resource cost of monitoring .19
A lower premium on external funds implies a reduced propagation of productivity shocks,
the volatility of the v-u ratio dropping to 7.03 and the relative volatility of unemployment
to 1.59. The inverse is observed when the premium on external ￿nance is raised to 135
points, the relative standard deviation of  rising to 13.42. With respect to the measure of
persistence, the change in the premium a￿ects mainly the auto-correlation at the second and
third lags, a higher premium generating lower coe￿cients. This contrasts with the negligible
e￿ects of the monitoring cost on the steady state rate of unemployment presented in Table
1.
In order to fully illustrate the range of ampli￿cation as a function of the degree of agency
costs, Figure 5 plots the e￿ect of varying the steady state resource cost of monitoring  over
the range [0;0:5] for the main measure of ampli￿cation used in this paper. The dashed
horizontal line in Figure 5 marks the result for the standard model, to which the model
18Addressing the lack persistence in the growth rate of output in the basic RBC model motivates Andol-
fatto’s (1996) work on incorporating search on labor markets to this class of models. He shows that the
problem of persistence can be resolved for certain parametrization of the labor market.
19A 55 point premium is achieved be setting  = 0:15 and a 135 point premium for  = 0:35.
28Table 3: Robustness to credit market parametrization
Baseline Premium Leverage ratio Elasticity of
55 points 135 points 0.5 4 t
a b a b a b a b a b a b
U 2.37 -0.75 1.59 -0.67 3.00 -0.79 1.74 -0.65 2.47 -0.77 1.64 -0.70
V 8.95 0.97 5.90 0.98 11.34 0.95 6.31 0.98 9.46 0.97 6.18 0.98
 10.58 0.99 7.03 0.98 13.42 0.99 7.60 0.97 11.10 0.99 7.31 0.99
(Y ) 1.15 1.06 1.24 1.06 1.17 1.07
:  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
corr(; 1) 0.48 0.15 0.48 0.08 0.43 0.22 0.55 0.08 0.30 0.19 0.42 0.09
corr(; 2) 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.20 0.21 0.08 0 0.13 0.02 0.08
corr(; 3) 0 0.05 0.01 0.03 0 0.07 0.07 0.05 0 0.05 0 0.03
a: Standard deviation relative to output; b: contemporaneous correlation with output.
All moments, but growth rate, are Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered;
converges as the resource cost of monitoring  tends to 0, as illustrated by the solid line.
Finally, this application of the costly state veri￿cation problem to ￿nancial markets
di￿ers some the standard set-up by assuming a time-varying resource cost of monitoring t
on the grounds that, according to the estimates by Levine et al (2004), the cost of default
to a lender is greater in a recession than an expansion. The baseline elasticity was chosen
to be consistent with their estimates of the magnitude of its variation. As a veri￿cation of
the sensitivity of the results along this dimension, the last columns of Table 1 reports the
e￿ects of reducing this elasticity by 50%. This yields a relative volatility of market tightness
of 7.3, still twice the magnitude of the standard search model, while the persistence in the
growth rate remains relatively unchanged.
The implications of changing the fraction of vacancy costs requiring external funds is
examined in the last columns of Table 3. Such variations alter the elasticity of assets to
aggregate shocks, thereby signi￿cantly a￿ecting the dynamics of the shadow cost of external
funds. For example, calibrating to a leverage ratio of 0.5 generates persistence in the growth
rate of market tightness of 0.55, 0.21 and 0.07 at the ￿rst, second and third lags. This comes































































Model with credit friction
Standard model
Baseline calibration 
Figure 5: Variations in the resource cost of monitoring  and the volatility of market tight-
ness
very close to matching the persistence in the growth rate observed in the data. This gain,
however, is achieved at the expense of less ampli￿cation. The relative standard deviation
of market tightness is now 7.60, compared to 10.58 in the baseline calibration. Smaller
movements in markets tightness then lead to less movement in unemployment and less
persistence in the growth of output. A doubling of the steady state leverage ratio has a
modest inverse e￿ect, as can be seen in the last columns of Table 3. Thus, along this
dimension, ampli￿cation and persistence on labor markets move in opposite direction.
3.4.3 Sensitivity to the calibration of the labor market and the volatility of
wages
This section ￿rst examines the sensitivity of the main results to changes in the calibration of
labor market speci￿c parameters and then examines the dynamics of the wage. With results
presented in Table 4, we look at the impact of variations in the unit cost of vacancies, the
value of the bargaining weight  and the value of non-market activities b.
Decreasing the unit cost of job vacancies  from 0.25 to 0.125 implies a lower steady
state rate of unemployment such that, though the relative volatility of market tightness is
slightly greater than for the baseline calibration, the standard deviation of aggregate output
30declines from 1.15 to 1.13. Increasing this cost to 0.5 has the exact opposite implication,
with a relative standard deviation of market tightness going from 10.58 to 10.46. However,
as the stock of unemployed is larger under this scenario, there is slightly more persistence
in the growth rate of market tightness.
Table 4: Robustness to labor market parametrization
Vacancy cost  Bargaining weight  Value of Unemp. b
0.125 0.5 0.05 0.9 0.5 0.95
a b a b a b a b a b a b
U 2.55 -0.76 2.19 -0.73 3.26 -0.73 1.73 -0.72 2.21 -0.74 3.11 -0.86
V 8.88 0.98 9.03 0.96 9.59 0.99 9.00 0.94 7.67 0.98 15.00 0.97
 10.72 0.99 10.46 0.98 12.45 0.95 9.96 0.97 9.27 0.98 16.81 0.93
(Y ) 1.13 1.17 1.09 1.21 1.09 1.63
:  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
corr(; 1) 0.40 0.14 0.46 0.14 0.62 0.12 0.43 0.15 0.44 0.10 0.34 0.44
corr(; 2) -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.24 0.08 0 0.18 -0.01 0.10 0.05 0.38
corr(; 3) 0 0.02 0 0.08 0.08 0.02 0 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0 0.24
a: Standard deviation relative to output; b: contemporaneous correlation with output.
All moments, but for growth rates, are Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered;
The current model resulted in a certain degree of wage rigidity contributing to ampli-
￿cation beyond that originating from the cost channel outlined above. In order to gain a
sense of the magnitude of the rigidity induced, consider that the elasticity of wages with
respect to productivity in U.S. time series is 0.53, as documented in Gertler and Trigari
(2009). This elasticity is the cross-product of a contemporaneous correlation between wages
and productivity of 0.62 and a relative volatility of wages to productivity of 0.85. 20 The
calibration strategy in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), which is anchored on this low elas-
ticity of wages in the data, is achieved by a reduction in the relative volatility of wages and
not the correlation with productivity (again, see Gertler and Trigari 2009). Both Pissarides
(2009) and Haefke et al (2008), however, argue that the empirically relevant wage, that of
20For a surveys of wage time series and their properties, see Brandolini (1995) and Abraham and Halti-
wanger (1995).
31new matches or hires, is characterized by a high degree of volatility and near proportionality
with productivity.
The introduction of credit frictions results in a standard deviation of wages relative to
productivity of 0.98 , and a cross-correlation with productivity of 0.95. Thus the elasticity
of wage in the baseline calibration is 0.93. By comparison, the relative standard deviation of
wages in the standard model is 0.92, and the contemporaneous correlation is near unity. Since
the time series for the aggregate wage present a low elasticity to productivity, the bargaining
weight of workers is reduced to to  = 0:05, keeping all remaining parameters constant. It
is important to stress that this calibration yield interesting results without relying on a
small value of the surplus to the ￿rm-worker pair (the replacement ratio is 0.86). First, the
elasticity of wages to productivity is now 0.70, the product of a relative volatility of 0.87
and correlation of 0.80, bringing the dynamics of wages much closer to the data. Second,
this additional wage rigidity yields a little more ampli￿cation and, importantly, much more
persistence in the growth rate of market tightness. The latter is now 0.62, 0.24 and 0.08
and the ￿rst, second and third lags. The standard deviation of market tightness and job
vacancies are now, respectively, 12.45 and 9.59. Thus with a lower value to the worker’s
bargaining weight, the model does a very good job at matching both the ampli￿cation and
persistence of labor market variables to productivity shocks. Signi￿cantly, the same exercise
yields virtually no change in volatility and the persistence of the growth rate of market
tightness in the standard model without reducing the size of the labor surplus by increasing
the value of non-market activities.
Finally, the signi￿cance of a small labor surplus in generating ampli￿cation in search
models of equilibrium unemployment is illustrated by the last columns of Table 4. If the
value of non-market activities is set to b = 0:95, the relative standard deviations of market
32tightness and job vacancies increase to 16.81 and 15, respectively, while the standard devia-
tion of aggregate output increases to 1.63. The changes are less pronounced when the value
of non-market activities is reduced to 0.5.
3.4.4 The Beveridge curve and cross-correlations
One concern for extensions to the standard framework is the violation of a robust empirical
observation of a strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, or the
Beveridge curve. This occurs, for instance, when allowing for jobs to end endogenously as in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Table 5 presents the contemporaneous cross-correlations
of key labor market variables in the data and generated by the models. In this respect the
proposed model o￿ers a moderate improvement on the standard search model of equilibrium
unemployment, generating a correlation between unemployment and vacancies of -0.62. This
gain is due to the appearance of a positive short run auto-correlation in the growth rate of
job vacancies.
The data are also characterized by a very strong negative correlation between the un-
employment rate and the measure of labor market tightness, with a contemporaneous cor-
relation of -0.97. The standard model generates a somewhat weak correlation of -0.67. The
presence of credit frictions, by inducing persistence in the adjustment of market tightness
that mirrors that of unemployment, brings the correlation closer to the data at -0.75. By
extension, the proposed model also improves on the correlation between the unemployment
and job ￿nding rates.
Finally, the proposed model is able to reduce the correlation between unemployment and
labor productivity to -0.57, closer to a correlation of -0.42 in the data. This correlation is too
strong in the standard labor search model, which generates a correlation of -0.65. This can
33be understood from the fact that credit market imperfections, which amplify movements in
unemployment that peak several quarters after labor productivity, increase the disconnect
between the two variables. Both models fall short, however, of being consistent with the
correlations between labor productivity and vacancies or market tightness. These have a
mild positive correlation in the data, around 0.4, whereas both models generate very high
positive correlations.
Table 5: Labor market cross-correlations
U.S. data
U V  f() Y=N
U 1.00 -0.89 -0.97 -0.95 -0.41
V - 1 0.98 0.90 0.36
 - - 1 0.95 0.40
f() - - - 1 0.40
Y=N - - - - 1
Labor search Labor search - Credit friction
U V  f() Y=N U V  f() Y=N
U 1 -0.52 -0.67 -0.67 -0.65 1 -0.62 -0.75 -0.75 -0.57
V - 1 0.98 0.98 0.99 - 1 0.98 0.98 0.98
 - - 1 1 0.99 - - 1 1 0.96
f() - - - 1 0.99 - - - 1 0.96
Y=N - - - - 1 - - - - 1
All moments are Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered; Data sources: BLS, BEA and Fujita and Ramey (2008).
3.5 Extension to ￿nancing the wage bill and vacancy costs
Vacancy costs represent a small fraction of operating expenses and a natural issue is whether
the results are robust to ￿rms ￿nancing a fraction of both the wage bill and vacancy costs
externally. This ￿rst extension reinforces the argument that the key e￿ect of credit market
imperfections for job creation is to alter the evolution of the opportunity cost resources used
to recruit workers independently of the assumption on the fraction for current costs funded
externally.
34De￿ne ￿rm period revenue as xXtNt and assume now that vacancy costs Vt and the
wage bill WtNt must be paid before production occurs. All agents observe the aggregate
state Xt and, given initial assets At, ￿rms borrow (Vt + WtNt   At) from ￿nancial markets
to pay for period operating costs. Again, lenders and borrowers agree on a contract that
speci￿es job vacancies and a cuto￿ productivity x such that if x > x, the borrower pays
xtXtNt and keeps the equity (x   xt)XtNt. If x < x; the borrower receives nothing and the
lender claims the residual net of monitoring costs. The expected gross share of returns going
to the lender and expected monitoring costs retain the same form, such that the lender’s
participation constraint is now [ (xt)   tG(xt)]XtNt = (Vt + WtNt   At), which again
states that the returns net of monitoring costs must equal the value of the loan. Aggregate
assets now evolve according to At+1 = & [1    (xt)]XtNt and the premium associated with
external funds is expressed as
tG(xt)XtNt
Vt+WtNt At, which for any t > 0 is strictly positive. The
modi￿ed optimal incentive compatible contracting problem with non-stochastic monitoring
and repayment within the period is now:
Jt = max
Vt;xt




subject to [ (xt)   tG(xt)]XtNt = (Vt + WtNt   At)
and Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + Vtp(t)
3.5.1 Job creation and wages
Retaining the notation for the multiplier on the lender’s participation constraint, , the opti-





in which the marginal value of a worker to the ￿rm, JN;t is now JN;t = [1    (xt)]Xt +
t ([ (xt)   tG(xt)]Xt   Wt)+(1 )Et
t+1
t JN;t+1, with a similar interpretation as ear-
35lier. Making use of 
(xt)  1    (xt) + t [ (xt)   tG(xt)] to simplify the notation, the














Relative to earlier, the term t+1Wt+1 on the right hand side of the expression captures the
fact that opportunity cost of wages paid to a new hire for the ￿rm depends on the degree




The wage is again determined by splitting the surplus of a worker-￿rm match under a








+ (1   )b (12)
As earlier, both the job creation condition (11) and the wage rule (12) collapse to (8) and
(10) when monitoring costs  tend to 0.
3.5.2 Results
This extension follows the calibration strategy for the baseline model, adopting the spec-
i￿cation of a low value of the worker’s bargaining weight as this brings the model closer
generating the degree persistence in the growth rate market tightness seen in the data.
With regards to ampli￿cation, as reported in Table 6, the results are broadly similar to
the previous model, although the relative volatility of market tightness is slightly lower.
The main di￿erence appears in the persistence in the growth rate of market tightness, the
’hump’ in the response being less pronounced. This is seen in lower measures of order auto-
36correlation at the ￿rst lag. Table 6 also presents the contemporaneous cross-correlations of
labor market variables. Once again, the results are robust to this extension to ￿nancing a
fraction of the wage bill on imperfect credit markets.
Table 6: Unconditional 2nd moments - extension to current costs
Baseline model Financing wage
with  = 0:05 and vacancy costs
Variable: a b a b
U 3.26 -0.73 2.82 -0.73
V 9.59 0.99 9.74 0.99
 12.45 0.95 11.86 0.99
(Y ) 1.09 1.15
:  Y  Y
corr(; 1) 0.62 0.12 0.24 0.18
corr(; 2) 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.09
corr(; 3) 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.05
Contemporaneous cross-correlations:
U V  f() Y=N
U 1 -0.68 -0.80 -0.80 -0.55
V - 1 0.98 0.98 0.98
 - - 1 1 0.94
f() - - - 1 0.94
Y=N - - - - 1
a: Standard deviation relative to output; b: contemporaneous
correlation with output. All moments, but growth
rates, are Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered; Data sources: BLS, BEA.
4 Conclusion
It has been argued that the standard search and matching model of equilibrium unemploy-
ment cannot generate su￿cient propagation as productivity shocks, by inducing a rise in
wages, have little e￿ect on ￿rm pro￿ts from a new employee and, hence, on the incentive
to post job vacancies. This paper has shown that when vacancies must be funded in part
on frictional credit markets, agency problems can lead to higher, time-varying, opportunity
costs of the resources involved that greatly increase the elasticity of vacancies to productivity.
37The quantitative exercise has shown that this ￿nancial accelerator contributes signi￿cantly
to bringing the model closer to the cyclical ￿uctuations of labor market variables found in
the data, both in terms of volatility and persistence. The paper thus concludes that the
dynamics of the opportunity of resources allocated to recruiting workers are an essential
element in understanding the cyclical behavior of job creation and the dynamics of the
labor market, echoing the conclusions in Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Pissarides (2009).
The originality here is that these costs evolve endogenously as a function of credit market
conditions and can simultaneously address the lack of ampli￿cation and persistence to pro-
ductivity shocks. While the macroeconomic consequences of credit market imperfections
have generally focused on their consequences for capital investment, e.g. models of ￿nancial
intermediation and agency costs by Bernanke et al. (1999) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
this paper ￿nds that their implications for labor markets should not be overlooked.
Two questions remain that warrant further investigation in subsequent research. First,
how general these results are to the type of friction present on credit markets is an open
question. This can, however, be partially addressed by considering that any friction which
will generate a counter-cyclical premium on external resources will have the same qualitative
implications. Second, if hiring is conditional on the state of credit markets, it may be that
worker ￿ows, as opposed to investment in new capital goods, are an alternative channel for
the transmission of monetary policy shocks that a￿ect the cost of credit. This avenue seems
particularly promising as the propagation mechanism in the paper can be interpreted as
increasing the rigidity of the ￿rm’s marginal cost to changes in production. Often referred
in the New Keynesian literature as a greater degree of real rigidity, this property is known
to be essential for understanding the dynamics of in￿ation and for allowing any signi￿cant
scope to monetary policy.
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Job vacancies are measured using the Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Index. The un-
employment rate corresponds to the B.L.S series LNS14000000. The job ￿nding rate was
provided by Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey and is based on C.P.S. data. The raw monthly
series were ￿rst adjusted by a 12 month backward-looking moving average. Quarterly series
were then computed by averaging over monthly observations. Output was obtained from the
B.E.A. as Expenditure based and measured in 2000 chained dollars. Interest rate spreads
are calculated using data on Moody’s Seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond yield.
B Equilibrium search unemployment with credit market imperfections
This section details the derivation of the wage rule under Nash bargaining, the equilibrium
system of equations and the method for computing the steady state.
B.1 Wage determination
De￿ne the surplus to the worker-￿rm relationship as St = JN;t+
HN;t HU;t
t , where the ￿rm’s
surplus is JN;t and the worker’s surplus is
HN;t HU;t
t . Using the de￿nition for each marginal
44value, the joint surplus is expressed as:
St = 











Et [(1   f(t))HU;t+1 + f(t)HN;t+1]
St = 

































(xt), from which we have JN;t = (1   t)St and
HN;t HU;t
t = tSt. Using this
result, the above expression for the joint surplus can be rewritten as
St = 
(xt)Xt + (1   












t (1   t)St+1, we now have
St = 
(xt)Xt + (1   






(1   t)St = (1   t)[
(xt)Xt + (1   




45Equating this expression with the marginal value of an addition worker JN;t = (1 t)St =

(xt)(Xt   Wt) + (1   )
t
p(t) yields
[1 + t (
(xt)   1)]Wt = t [
(xt)Xt + tt] + (1   t)b









+ (1   )b
B.2 Equilibrium system of equations
The following 20 equations de￿ne the endogenous variables Yt, Ct, Nt, Ut, Vt, t, p(t), f(t),






















+ (1   )b
1=Ct = t
t = Ett+1(1 + rt)
Yt [1   tG(xt)] = Ct + Vt
Yt = XtNt
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + p(t)Vt
Ut+1 = (1   f(t))Ut + Nt



























(xt) = [1    (xt)] + t [ (xt)   tG(xt)]
B.3 Solving the steady state
Given a target steady state quarterly rate of default and the assumption of log-normality of
the distribution H(x),  and 
(x) are pinned down for a value of the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks x. The steady state market tightness, given choices on the
parameters , , , ,  and b, is found by solving 

(r+)
  + 

(x) = (1   )(1   b).
The remaining labor market variables are straightforward to compute, noting that  is
adjusted to achieve a desired level of unemployment. & is found such that the asset accu-
mulation and lender participation equations hold, and x is chosen such that we obtain a
steady state leverage ratio of 2.
47C Deriving the standard search and matching model of equi-
librium unemployment in discrete time
This section details what this paper terms the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search model of
equilibrium unemployment in discrete time. It is essentially drawn from the work of Monica
Merz (1996) and David Andolfatto (1997) in which workers are members of a representative
household and search passively on the labor market. Firms post job vacancies Vt to attract
unemployed workers Ut at a unit cost of : Jobs are ￿lled via a constant returns to scale
matching function taking vacancies and unemployed workers M(Ut;Vt): De￿ne t = Vt
Ut
as
labor market tightness from the point of view of the ￿rm, or the v-u ratio. The matching
probabilities are
M(Ut;Vt)
Vt = p(t) and
M(Ut;Vt)
Ut = f(t) for ￿rms and workers respectively,
with @p(t)=@t < 0 and @f(t)=@t > 0. Note that f(t) = tp(t): Once matched, jobs
are destroyed at the exogenous rate  per period. Thus employment Nt and unemployment
Ut evolve according to
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + p(t)Vt (13)
Ut+1 = (1   f(t))Ut + Nt (14)
The representative household, given existing employment and unemployment, chooses
optimal consumption and purchases of risk free bonds, which pay a rate rt the following




21As in Andolfatto (1996), each worker is a member of a household that o￿ers perfect insurance against
labor market outcomes and is involved in a passive search process.
48subject to the budget constraint WtNt +bUt +(1+rt 1)Bt 1 +t = Ct +Bt +Tt, and the
laws of motion for matched labor (13) and unemployment (14). The government raises Tt
in taxes to fund unemployment bene￿ts Utb, while employed workers earn the wage Wt. t
are ￿rm dividends rebated lump sum at the end of the period. Denoting the multiplier on
the budget constraint by ; the ￿rst order conditions are
(Ct) : UC(Ct) = t (15)
(Bt) : t = Ett+1(1 + rt) (16)
Firms post job vacancies to maximize their expected value
Jt = max
Vt




subject to the law of motion for employment (13) using the stochastic discount factor 
t+1
t .







equating the average cost of a vacancy,

p(t), to the expected marginal value of an additional
employed worker Et
t+1
t JN;t+1. In order to derive the marginal value of a worker to the
￿rm, JN;t, di￿erentiate the ￿rm’s value function with respect to N: JN;t = (Xt   Wt) +
(1   )Et
t+1
t JN;t+1. Combining the marginal value of a worker with the optimality con-
dition for vacancies, and making use of the household bond Euler equation (16), yields the













The model is fully described once the rule for wages is determined. In order to de￿ne
the values of a job (HN) and unemployment (HU) to a worker, di￿erentiate the household’s
value function with respect to N and U:
HN;t = tWt + Et [(1   )HN;t+1 + HU;t+1]
HU;t = tb + Et [(1   f(t))HU;t+1 + f(t)HN;t+1]
which as the same interpretation as in the text. Splitting the surplus of a worker-￿rm match,
de￿ned as St = JN;t +
HN;t HU;t
t , under a generalization of Nash bargaining yields the wage
rule
Wt =  [Xt + t] + (1   )b (18)
C.1 Equilibrium system of equations













Wt =  [Xt + t] + (1   )b
1=Ct = t
t = Ett+1(1 + rt)
50Yt = Ct + Vt
Yt = XtNt
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + p(t)Vt








C.2 Computing the steady state




  + 

= (1   )[1   b]. The remaining labor market variables are
straightforward to compute, noting that  is adjusted to achieve a desired level of unem-
ployment.
51D Extension to ￿nancing wage bill and vacancy costs
D.1 Deriving the wage rule
This subsection details the steps to obtaining the wage rule of section 4.1. The joint ￿rm-
worker surplus in this scenario is given by:
St = 











Et [(1   f(t))HU;t+1 + f(t)HN;t+1]
St = 
















The solution to the Nash bargaining process results in the surplus being split according to
JN;t = (1 t)St and
HN;t HU;t
t = tSt, where in this case t =

+(1 )t. Using this result,
the above expression for the joint surplus can be rewritten as
St = 












t (1   t)St+1, we now have
St = 
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52Equating this expression with the marginal value of an additional worker JN;t = (1 t)St =

(xt)Xt   tWt + (1   )
t
p(t) yields
[1 + t (t   1)]Wt = t [
(xt)Xt + tt] + (1   t)b








+ (1   )b
D.2 Equilibrium system of equations
The following 20 equations de￿ne the endogenous variables Yt, Ct, Nt, Ut, Vt, t, p(t), f(t),





















+ (1   )b
1=Ct = t
t = Ett+1(1 + rt)
Yt [1   tG(xt)] = Ct + Vt
Yt = XtNt
Nt+1 = (1   )Nt + p(t)Vt
Ut+1 = (1   f(t))Ut + Nt



























(xt) = [1    (xt)] + t [ (xt)   tG(xt)]
D.3 Solving the steady state
Given a target steady state quarterly rate of default and the assumption of log-normality of
the distribution H(x),  and 
(x) are pinned down for a value of the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks x. The steady state market tightness, given choices on the
parameters , , , ,  and b, is found by solving 

(r+)
  + 







remaining labor market variables are straightforward to compute, noting that  is adjusted
to achieve a desired level of unemployment. & is found such that the asset accumulation
and lender participation equations hold, and x is chosen such that we obtain a steady state
leverage ratio of 2.
54